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I. INTRODUCTION
I tell my law students that we are gladiators. We slay injustices while
protecting liberty. We battle other gladiators, incapacitate violent criminals,
and watch over those without a voice. When the people ring the bell signaling
the need to restructure the functions of institutions and practices, lawyers enter
the arena ready for combat. In America, the inimitable skills of counsel are
constitutionally recognized and celebrated. The Framers considered the right
to counsel so critical to the republic that it is enshrined in the text of the Sixth
Amendment. Whether majorities of the Supreme Court have held this right in
such high esteem is debatable. The Court’s jurisprudence has erratically expanded and restricted the right to counsel, leaving its scope far from certain.
Beginning in 1932 with Powell v. Alabama,1 the U.S. Supreme Court has
grappled with defining the constitutional contours of the right to counsel.
While both Powell and Gideon v. Wainwright2 spurred a hope that criminal
*
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1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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justice – particularly in the South – would change, Strickland v. Washington3
suppressed any existing optimism that such change would be meaningful. Nevertheless, recent cases such as Padilla v. Kentucky,4 Missouri v. Frye,5 and
Lafler v. Cooper6 have reinvigorated the discourse concerning the constitutional boundaries surrounding the Sixth Amendment guarantee, offering a hint
that the Court may be redirecting its jurisprudence. These new cases not only
present an opportunity to re-examine the substantive doctrine, but also to furnish an occasion to review and build upon existing theories of judicial decisionmaking.
In constructing theoretical frames used to evaluate judicial decision-making, scholars wrestle with opinions that do not rest on neutral constitutional
principles but provide socio-politically acceptable outcomes. This phenomenon is constantly evaluated and rationalized in a myriad of ways, producing a
rich literature that may be utilized to explain and resolve vital questions regarding the status of fundamental rights. This Article aims to add to this existing
literature by analyzing judicial decision-making within the context of the right
to counsel. While it is arguable that these cases rest on neutral principles, a
closer examination reveals that the Court’s fidelity to an underlying principle
of equality is changeable, ebbs and flows, and may be influenced by considerations outside of doctrine – namely American political culture. Through the
application of interest convergence theory, this Article hopes to explain the
Court’s fluctuating jurisprudence by identifying and examining eras of convergence and divergence through surveying the domestic and international climate
at the time of a given decision.
“Interest convergence,” a theoretical frame developed by the late Professor Derrick Bell, contends that the jurisprudential interests or “rights” of minority groups are only judicially recognized when they support the values and
interests of the dominant group.7 I argue that Professor Bell’s theory, while
intensely criticized,8 provides a kernel of truth that may help competing sides
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133 (2012).
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012).
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) [hereinafter Bell, Brown].
8. The following articles apply, assess, or critique interest convergence: Justin
Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 157
(2011); Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the
Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 939 (2007); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roundelay, Hernandez v. Texas and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 23, 63 (2006); Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence
(Dis)Course: Moving from White Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1061, 1114–18 (2006); Bryan L. Adamson, The H’aint in the (School) House: The
Interest Convergence Paradigm in State Legislatures and School Finance Reform, 43
CAL. W. L. REV. 173, 174 (2006); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell
Toll: The Bell Tolls for Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1510 (2005); Sheryll D.
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in the justice system find a way to work together. Having roots in “rational
choice” models of decision-making, Bell’s theory posits that a confluence of
interests determine judicial decisions.9 For him, judges, traditionally members
of the dominant group, bring values and interests into the judicial decisionmaking process.10 In deciding cases, judges tend to issue decisions with an
outcome that maintains the status quo, as well as language that mirrors the political culture, instead of offering a meaningful remedy that may disrupt the
social order.11 With doctrinal periods of expansion and retrenchment, the jurisprudential sway of the Court’s “contradiction closing cases” concerning the
right to counsel appear to reflect the political culture at the time the case was
litigated. This Article will demonstrate the way in which external considerations may have influenced the Court with first recognition and expansion of the
right to counsel in Powell and Gideon, the Court’s subsequent restriction of the
right in Strickland and Hill,12 and the Court’s slight expansion of the right in
recent cases such as Padilla, Frye, and Lafler. In this Article, I argue that interest convergence helps explain the Court’s trend on the issue of right to counsel. With the emphasis on seeing “the world as it is rather than how we might
Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 271 n.67 (2005); Tomiko Brown-Nagin,
Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1436, 1474 (2005); Maria Pabón López, Reflections on Educating Latino and
Latina Undocumented Children: Beyond Plyer v. Doe, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1373,
1377 (2005); Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions, Risk, and Race, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1501, 1505 (2004); Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of Integration
Past, Present, and Future, 47 HOW. L.J. 795, 827 (2004); Paul Frymer & John D.
Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the New Significance
of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 678 (2004); Steven A. Ramirez, Games
CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America’s Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1612–13 (2004); Daria
Roithmayr, Tacking Left: A Radical Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 213
(2004); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1764 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND
A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela
P. Harris eds., 2002)); Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections
on the Id, the Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J.
2279, 2284 (2001); Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts? Righting the Wrongs of
Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2539 (2001); Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and
Power: The Limits of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 833,
871–72 (1996); Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration
Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273,
283–84 n.41 (1996); Christine H. Rossell, The Convergence of Black and White Attitudes on School Desegregation Issues During the Four Decade Evolution of the Plans,
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 630–33 (1995); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a
Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 66 (1988).
9. Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 521.
10. Id. at 523.
11. Id. at 526–27.
12. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
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want it to be,” the interest convergence paradigm may be a tool in addressing
critical issues that continue to linger in American society by allowing for contemporary socio-political realities to enter the analysis.
In applying interest convergence, I do attempt to follow Bell’s model of
analysis in that I only provide a general overview of major occurrences and
events, as opposed to offering a comprehensive evaluation of each specific external variable. The purpose of this Article is to utilize the frame to identify
eras of convergence and divergence by highlighting many seminal cases, as
opposed to analyzing one specific era or case.
I do not adopt the black-white binary paradigm of race. Instead, I propose
that the two constituent groups consist of the “dominant” group and the “subordinate group.” The dominant group comprises upper class and wealthy, primarily white, constituents with political capital and influence. The subordinate
group includes the working poor and minority groups who lack political capital
and influence. Who, or which group, should count as “dominant” or “subordinate” may vary somewhat according to the context or issue. Sometimes overall
group wealth or group size is crucial, but in other contexts, the ability to organize efficiently at low cost may count more than sheer wealth or numbers of
mere aggregates with less individually at stake. I do, however, recognize the
differences inherent in grouping racially diverse interests in one category and
also realize the limitations it may place on the receptivity of my thesis. Where
appropriate, I do acknowledge and discuss the divisions within the subordinate
group and potential causes. This, or any other binary, obviously sacrifices descriptive adequacy for the sake of a better combination of simplicity and explanatory power. However, in the quest to formulate a pragmatic analysis on
the topic of right to counsel jurisprudence, I think it appropriate to cluster constituents that share a similar interest at a similar time in one category for this
limited purpose.
In addition, the understanding of the “equality principle” in this Article
differs from that of Bell. For Bell, the equality principle is manifested in the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically guaranteeing racial equality.13 The equality principle in this Article refers to a more basic
and abstract notion of equality in the vein of John Rawls and Ronald
Dworkin.14 The cases reviewed below were primarily decided pursuant to the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as opposed to Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection, although there is some variation.15 In Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the notion of equality appears more fluid. It includes not only an
equality of treatment under the law, but also an equality of opportunity. While
it does include a racial equality component, the jurisprudence has evolved to
discuss equality more in terms of opportunity and equality among the social

13. Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 522.
14. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1068 (1975); see

also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 81 (1971).
15. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV.
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classes. Equality also, at times, includes an element of fairness, making it difficult to separate the two substantive concepts. In analyzing the development
of the constitutional right to counsel, the equality principle must be flexible
enough to reflect an accurate doctrinal interpretation of the concept in the construction of the Sixth Amendment. For purposes of this Article, the equality
principle is thus understood to encompass more than racial equality.
Part II provides a brief and basic overview of existing theoretical models
of judicial decision-making and examines Bell’s interest convergence theory
in depth. This Part not only explains the interest convergence framework and
“contradiction closing cases,” but also reviews the application of this theory by
other scholars in different contexts. Parts III to V examine eras of convergence
and divergence throughout the development of right to counsel jurisprudence
by employing the interest convergence frame. Cases chosen for study were
selected based on prominence in political culture and doctrinal parallels.
Through the evaluation of key U.S. Supreme Court cases, Part III aims to
demonstrate that when the values and interests of the dominant group converge
with those of the subordinate group, as in Powell and Gideon, civil liberties are
theoretically extended, granting concessions to the subordinate group. However, when dominant interests diverge from those of the subordinate group, the
interpretation of fundamental rights is constrained as manifested in Strickland
and Hill. Part III reviews the decisions in Powell and Gideon, finding an era
of convergence allying interests on the principle of equality. Part IV focuses
on Strickland and Hill, uncovering a commonality between the decisions and
the political culture: a retrenchment from the equality principle. Part V discusses Padilla, Frye, and Lafler, concluding that a confluence of factors,
namely mass incarceration and a concern with the effectiveness of criminal
justice administration, worked to align the interests of the dominant group with
the subordinate group. Part VI concludes with a review of the thesis and comments to consider moving forward.

II. JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND THE INTEREST CONVERGENCE
PARADIGM
Firmly entrenched in our democratic system of government, the exercise
of judicial review continues to be utilized by the U.S. Supreme Court. As an
academic genre, judicial decision-making remains a vibrant and rigorous topic
of debate, offering an abundance of fresh critiques and innovative theories
within every generation of scholars. The numerous paradigms and frames employed to explain both the exercise of judicial review and outcomes in specific
cases demonstrate the doctrine’s complexity and changeability. This Article
aims to build upon this practice and offer a new application of a highly influential and often criticized theory of judicial decision-making: interest convergence.
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A. Overview of Existing Models
Since Marbury v. Madison,16 the Court, through the power of judicial review, has wielded constitutional authority to issue binding decisions premised
on uncertain, and often criticized, bases. Judicial review is understood to establish a union between the theoretical principles admired in the Constitution
and actual practices in American political culture.17 The doctrine itself is premised upon the idea of constitutionalism, requiring “that legitimate governmental power is limited by fundamental principles contained in a source of higher
law that supersedes policies adopted through the ordinary political process.”18
In the United States, this higher law is the Constitution, and it is enforced
through the exercise of judicial review.19 Marbury v. Madison thus established
a counter-majoritarian force in the Court, with the constitutional power to invalidate legislative action that it determined violated fundamental constitutional principles.20
Scholars have long struggled with understanding judicial decision-making.21 “Formalists” contend that judges should decide cases by employing traditional modes of interpretation, including surveying case law, statutes, and
constitutions.22 For formalists, judicial decision-making requires an assessment of only facts and law.23 Normative concerns, such as morality and politics, are irrelevant to exercises in legal analysis.24

16. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
17. Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutional Hypocrisy, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 557,

557 (2011) [hereinafter Spann, Hypocrisy].
18. Id. at 559.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. This Article is only concerned with four theories: formalism, legal realism,
interpretivism, and critical race studies. See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
(1961); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978); Michael J. Klarman,
Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 432 (2005) (citing
Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2001) (reviewing
HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL:
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999)).
22. See Dworkin, supra note 14, at 1057–58; Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 438 (1985); SUPREME COURT DECISION–MAKING: NEW
INSTITUTIONALISTS APPROACHES 57–61 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds.,
1999).
23. Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 16
LEGAL THEORY 111 (2010), http://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325210000121; RICHARD A.
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 41 (2008).
24. Leiter, supra note 23.
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In strict contrast to the position taken by formalists, legal realists argue
that when jurisprudence fails to explain judicial decision-making, social science will.25 This school of thought maintains that judicial interpretation mirrors the individual values and biases of judges.26 For legal realists, there is
more to judicial determinations than a mechanical application of constitutional
principles.27 One can never truly know the actual reasons for a judge’s decision.28
An extension of realist philosophy, interpretivists argue that moral principles and established institutional practices play some role in judicial decisionmaking.29 For interpretivists, the process through which institutional practices
determine rights follows from some moral principle that gives the institutional
practice itself the role to make those decisions.30 Thus, the rights so determined
have legitimate moral force.
As an outgrowth of the realist and interpretivist movements, critical race
and critical legal studies began to take shape.31 Critical race and critical legal
theorists stressed that judicial interpretations of constitutional doctrine often
tipped the outcome in favor of the dominant group.32 By emphasizing that such
outcomes were both neutral and needed, judges could claim that decisions were
appropriately detached from external influences.33 For example, Professor
Girardeau Spann believes “legal doctrine is unable to provide determinate answers to particular disputes.”34 He contends that the Supreme Court is akin to
a third policymaking branch within a tricameral legislature, more likely to reflect the values of American political culture than the guardian of principles
espoused in the Constitution.35 With this, Professor Spann declares judicial
review should be abolished.36 While not calling for the wholesale removal of
judicial review, interest convergence seeks to rationalize decisions in those
“hard cases” where doctrine and case outcome fail to align.37
25. See ELY, supra note 21, at 44–48.
26. See JEFFREY A. SEGALL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE

ATTITUDINAL MODEL 231–35 (1993); see also Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781,
784 (1983).
27. See ELY, supra note 21, at 44–48.
28. See id.
29. See Dworkin, supra note 14, at 1060, 1103–05.
30. See id.
31. Spann, Hypocrisy, supra note 17, at 560.
32. Robin West, Critical Legal Studies – The Missing Years, in NORMATIVE
JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 107, 166 (2011).
33. See id.
34. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997, 1007 (1985). See also Girardeau A. Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative
Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473, 528 (1984) [hereinafter Spann, Veto].
35. Spann, Veto, supra note 34, at 516.
36. See id. at 526.
37. See Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 523.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 9

140

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

B. Interest Convergence
As a theoretical frame, interest convergence has a fascinating history and
an even more interesting evolution as a paradigm transcending the bounds of
its initial application. Coined and crafted by the late Professor Derrick Bell in
1980, interest convergence continues to be both celebrated and criticized, all
the while remaining a highly debated and controversial theoretical model.38
Used and evaluated by dozens of scholars in a variety of contexts, interest convergence remains relevant and influential, outlasting other theories.39
Inspired by Professor Herbert Wechsler’s critique of the Brown decision,40 Bell’s article rolled out a theoretical framework much in line with
Wechsler’s need for a “principled appraisal” of government action.41
Wechsler’s analysis “emphasize[d] the world as it is rather than how we might
want it to be,” a tenet with which Bell very much agreed.42 With this, Bell
offered to resolve Wechsler’s quandary regarding Brown, namely that the opinion failed to rest on principled reasoning.43
In his article, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,44
Wechsler criticized the Brown Court for deciding the case without a basis in
neutral principles.45 His primary criticism lay in the notion that courts “must
be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in
reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate
result that is achieved.”46 For Wechsler, courts are capable of engaging in a
principled assessment of government action that exceeds a rigid historical interpretation of constitutional provisions without becoming an activist court.47
Weschler concluded that this type of reasoning was notably missing from the
Brown decision, thereby calling into question the opinion’s legitimacy.48
Wechsler reviewed and dismissed the prospect that Brown stood for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racial line drawing in legislation.49 He determined that the Brown Court must have supported its holding
by finding that “racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of equality to the
minority against whom it is directed; that is, the group that is not dominant
politically and, therefore, does not make the choice involved.”50 Wechsler
38. See generally id.
39. See, e.g., id.
40. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73

HARV. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (1959).
41. Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 520 (citing Wechsler, supra note 40, at 16).
42. Id. at 523.
43. See id. at 523–24.
44. See generally Wechsler, supra note 40.
45. See id. at 15.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 16.
48. See id. at 21–22.
49. See id. at 29–30.
50. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
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found this reasoning untenable because it would require questioning the motives of the legislature.51 He then posited that the legal issue with segregation
was a question of associational rights. Wechsler reasoned that “if the freedom
of association is denied by segregation, integration forces an association upon
those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant.”52 Wechsler concluded his critique with a question:
Given a situation where the state must practically choose between denying the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on
those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution demands that the claims for association should
prevail?53

In response, Bell suggested that the normative principle of racial equality “underlay” the decision in Brown.54 However, because most Americans did not
regard this equality principle as a widespread social or political goal, interest
convergence was the primary motivation of the Court for handing down a racially egalitarian decision.55

1. The Theory
In his highly controversial and often-cited 1980 Harvard Law Review article, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
Professor Bell discussed the principle of “interest convergence” in depth.56
The original intention in offering the theory was to advance a positivistic expression of a neutral principle that could explain U.S Supreme Court opinions
in the school desegregation cases pre- and post-Brown.57 In its purest form,
interest convergence provides that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of
whites.”58 Thus, Bell perceived the civil rights reforms of the 1950s and 1960s
not as noble acts representative of the American equality principle, but as
changes made because they held political value to the white power structure.59
For Bell, “[W]hite elites will tolerate or encourage racial advances for blacks
only when such advances also promote [their own] self-interests.”60 He concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment would not permit a judicial remedy
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 522.
Id. at 523.
See generally id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 524.
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, at xvii (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic eds., 2000).
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providing real racial equality for blacks if such a remedy would threaten the
dominant status of whites.61
While acknowledging that there were whites motivated strictly by the
equality principle, Bell explained the way in which the Brown decision reflected a convergence of interests.62 He offered three specific occurrences in
political culture that could have influenced the Court’s ultimate decision.63
First, Bell suggested that Brown helped bolster the international image of democratic values during the Cold War.64 With communists choosing to highlight
segregation in their propaganda, Brown helped legitimize the democratic rhetoric of equality and freedom.65 By mandating desegregation in public education, Brown represented America’s commitment to equality on an international
stage.66
Second, Bell proposed that Brown supported America’s effort to convince
blacks they were a recognized segment of society.67 At the time Brown was
announced, blacks had fought in World War II against Nazi Germany.68 With
whites fearful that blacks would be reluctant to serve in future armed conflicts,
Brown articulated America’s promise of equality at home.69
Bell’s third and final consideration was the potential economic gains from
an industrialized South.70 State-sponsored segregation was preventing the
South from shifting from a rural society to a more industrialized and profitable
region.71 Whites interested in the potential gains from an industrialized South
viewed segregation as an obstacle to economic progress.72 These three concerns converged with the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality, coalescing around the ideas that segregation was a barrier to progress and a contravention of the equality principle.73 Without the convergence of these interests, black interests would languish as they did for decades prior to Brown.74
As Bell recognized, “[t]hese points may seem insufficient proof of self-interest
leverage to produce a decision as important as Brown,” however, they are cited
“to help assess and not to diminish” the Court’s decision.75
Bell found this era of convergence short-lived, with the Court “increasingly erect[ing] barriers to achieving the forms of racial balance relief it earlier
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 523.
See id. at 525.
Id. at 523–25.
See id. at 524.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 524–25.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 525.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 523.
Id. at 525.
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had approved.”76 He predicted retrenchment would likely follow an era of advancement.77 First, Brown II failed to require prompt desegregation of the nation’s public schools.78 Furthermore, the Court’s attitude seemingly changed.
Citing the Court in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman79 and Columbus
Board of Education v. Penick,80 Bell discussed the additional requirement that
plaintiffs must also prove intentional discrimination by school officials and that
relief granted is limited to the harm proven.81 He also pointed to the decisions
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education82 and Milliken v.
Bradley,83 where the Court deferred to local government busing plans despite
evidence of continued segregation.84 These opinions “elevated the concept of
‘local autonomy’ to a ‘vital national tradition.’”85 In a later article, Bell contended that the Court’s decision in Brown resulted in an interest divergence in
subsequent Brown litigation.86
Bell also declared Grutter v. Bollinger87 the “definitive example of []
[i]nterest-convergence.”88 With Grutter, a convergence of interests existed
with both Fortune 500 companies and the military working to diversify their
forces and the interests of racial minorities pursuing admission in elite law
schools.89 While the Court upheld the Michigan Law School’s admission program on constitutional grounds, Bell posited that the Court may have done so
because the plan “minimizes the importance of race while offering maximum
protection to whites and those aspects of society with which she [Grutter] identifies, she supported.”90 For Bell, “Once again, blacks and Hispanics are the

76. Id. at 527.
77. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current

Conditions, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5, 13 (1976).
78. Brown II refers to Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
79. Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 527 (citing Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
433 U.S. 406 (1977)).
80. Id. (citing Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 499, 464 (1977)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 530 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
31 (1971)).
83. Id. at 526 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 742 (1971)).
84. Id. at 526, 530.
85. Id. at 526 (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410
(1977)).
86. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 478 (1976).
87. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
88. Derrick A. Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624
(2003) [hereinafter Bell, Distractions].
89. Id. at 1623.
90. Id. at 1624. See also DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 149 (2004) [hereinafter
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS].
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fortuitous beneficiaries of a ruling that can and probably will change when
other priorities assert themselves.”91
Over time, Bell developed a phrase for Brown-type cases: “contradiction
closing cases”:92
That is, they narrow the gap between white and black rights that the
framers wrote into the Constitution. These cases serve as a shield
against excesses in the exercise of white power, yet they bring about no
real change in the status of blacks. . . . A decision may benefit some,
but more importantly, it provides blacks and liberals with the sense that
the system is not so bad after all. The “contradiction closing” cases
suggest that we can depend on the courts, if not for our salvation, then
at least for the correction of racial outrages.93

Bell suggested that the decisions in such cases transformed the Court into a
type of “judicial monitor,” granting concessions depending on the “cost” to
society.94 During eras of convergence, decisions in contradiction-closing cases
became key to reaffirming America’s commitment to freedom, fairness, and
equality.
Developed in the search of neutral principles that serve to explain judicial
activity in the school desegregation cases, interest convergence proved flexible
enough to apply to other contexts. It provides an assessment tool when trying
to make sense of important constitutional decisions that lack principled guidance from the Court. However, the limitations of the theory do not go unnoticed.

2. The Critique
The Northwestern Law Review recently published one of the most comprehensive and stimulating critiques of interest convergence.95 In Rethinking
the Interest-Convergence Thesis,96 Professor Driver argued interest convergence “is too often categorical where it should be nuanced and too often focused on continuity where it should acknowledge change.”97 In the article, he

91. BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 90, at 151; Bell, Distractions, supra
note 88, at 1624 (“[W]e could not obtain meaningful relief until policymakers perceived
that the relief blacks sought furthered interests or resolved issues of more primary concern.”).
92. Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 32
(1985).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 33.
95. Driver, supra note 8, at 165.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 157.
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presented “four analytical flaws” with the interest convergence paradigm,
which he argued weakened the theory’s “persuasiveness.”98
Driver’s first criticism is that the theory rests upon a far-reaching understanding of what exactly constitutes “black interest” and “white interest.”99 For
Driver, the intra-racial complexities, conflicts, and nuances cannot be broken
down into a singular “interest” in which that entire racial group concurs.100 The
failure of Bell to define these terms confuses the dialogue and debates regarding the meaning of the terms.101 Second, Driver asserts that interest convergence fails to pay adequate homage to racial progress that has been made, such
as the abandonment of “separate-but-equal” principles announced in Plessy v.
Ferguson.102 While he acknowledged that the “conditions are far from perfect,” Driver contends that interest convergence does not consider that “as
blacks and other people of color have received the dignitary effects traditionally reserved for whites, it follows that whiteness, on its own, has decreased in
value.”103 Third, Driver argues that interest convergence confers “insufficient
agency” to two of the most important actors in the debate – black citizens and
white judges.104 The theory “sharply discounts the capacity of black people to
participate in their own uplift” and “diminishes the culpability of white judges
who exercise their authority to maintain the existing racial hierarchy.”105 Finally, because interest convergence cannot be refuted, it supports judicial decisions concerning racial equality.106 This is so because, according to Driver,
the theory either argues that such decisions are essential compromises necessary to “maintain white racism,” or the theory ignores the decisions altogether.107 These flaws, in turn, lead to harmful consequences, such as limiting
the menu of possible remedial strategies for black advancement108 and reinforcing the racial paranoia and conspiracy theories already prevalent in black
communities.109
Driver’s critique is both thought provoking and valuable. However, it
often over complicates the simplistic, while simultaneously simplifying the
complex. For example, while emphasizing that Bell failed to define “black
interest” and “white interest,” Driver criticizes use of the terms as “overly
98. Id. at 156.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 166 (“Contrary to the notion advanced by the interest-convergence ide-

ology, however, there is no singular black agenda.”).
101. Id. at 156.
102. Id. at 170–73 (“While the goal of racial equality has certainly not yet been
fully realized, the racial progress that has been made over the generations has dramatically elevated the racial status of blacks.”).
103. Id. at 174–75.
104. Id. at 157.
105. Id. at 175.
106. Id. at 157.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 189.
109. Id. at 192–93.
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broad conceptualization[s],” creating confusion in the discourse.110 He further
points to intra-racial differences to demonstrate that there is “no singular black
agenda.”111 Bell, however, did describe and explain the interests to which he
was referring when using the terms “black interest” and “white interest.” In
the article, Bell was clear in his understanding that the “black interest” was in
that of racial equality.112 Regarding “white interest,” Bell identified the three
above-mentioned contextual concerns (the Cold War, domestic racial considerations, and Southern industrialization) that formulated the “white interest” in
reaffirming America’s commitment to equality.113 While Driver is surely right
that there are critical and important intra-racial differences that preclude a consensus on what exactly constitutes the “black agenda,” it is also surely right
that racial equality, as a principle, is an interest of all blacks, as it serves as the
constitutional foundation of their American citizenship.
Driver simplifies the complicated in his discussion, critiquing Bell’s focus on racial problems as opposed to racial progress.114 To Driver, Bell’s failure to acknowledge racial gains diminishes the persuasiveness of the paradigm.115 Driver points to Dred Scott116 and Plessy v. Ferguson117 in an effort
to demonstrate that racial progress has been made.118 It is, unfortunately, not
that simple. While it is true that we, as a country, are not in the same place
with race relations as we once were, it is also true that blacks are still lagging
far behind their white counterparts in all areas of American life.119 Thus, the
“racial progress” that Driver discusses must be measured relative to the gains
made by whites over time. Once that comparison is made, it is apparent that
“[t]he difference in the condition of slaves in one of the gradual emancipation

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 156.
Id. at 166.
Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 523.
Id. at 524–25.
Driver, supra note 8, at 171–75.
Id. at 156–57.
Id. at 173 (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856), superseded
by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
117. Id. (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1956)).
118. Id. at 172–73.
119. Lindsey Cook, U.S. Education: Still Separate and Unequal, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD
REP.:
DATA
MINE
(Jan.
28,
2015,
12:01
AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/01/28/us-education-stillseparate-and-unequal (surveying the education gap between black and white children,
the education funding gap between black and white schools, higher poverty rates among
black children, and the college admission gap between black and white college enrollment); Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gaps, STAN. CTR. FOR EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS,
http://cepa.stanford.edu/educational-opportunity-monitoring-project/achievementgaps/race/; Lindsey Cook, Why Black Americans Die Younger, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP.: DATA MINE (Jan. 5, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/datamine/2015/01/05/black-americans-have-fewer-years-to-live-heres-why.
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states and black people today is more of degree than of kind.”120 Nevertheless,
Driver’s critique provides insight into possible ways to strengthen interest convergence as a theoretical frame.

3. Use of the Frame
The use of interest convergence as an analytical frame has since expanded
beyond the realm of school desegregation. Scholars interested in the blackwhite binary continue to apply the frame to different legal developments.121
Interest convergence is also utilized by nonblack racial groups, including Asian
Americans122 and Latinos.123 For example, Professor Richard Delgado employed interest convergence to offer an explanation of the Court’s decision in
Hernandez v. Texas.124 In Hernandez, the Court determined that the exclusion
of persons of Mexican descent from jury service in a Texas county (where there
was a substantial number of qualified people of Mexican descent) was a violation of equal protection.125 In explaining the case within the interest convergence paradigm, Delgado pointed to three considerations that formulated the
dominant interest, thus yielding a racially egalitarian decision in the case: the
Cold War, dismal living conditions in Mexican communities, and communist
threats in nearby Latin America.126 In the article, he underscored American
domestic concerns and international affairs, highlighting the rise of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, Joe McCarthy’s communist paranoia, and Latin American unrest as possible influences contributing to the interest of the dominant
group.127
Interest convergence has frequently been applied in contexts outside of
race relations, including the First Amendment and employment discrimination
contexts.128 For example, Professor Stephen Feldman utilized the frame to analyze religious power in America vis-à-vis Supreme Court precedent.129 For
120. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 3, 16 (1979); see also DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM,
AND AMERICAN LAW 211 (5th ed. 2004).
121. Morrison, supra note 8, at 1114–18; Wilig, supra note 8, at 1510; Cashin, supra note 8, at 254–55.
122. Rhonda V. Magee, The Master’s Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses to
African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863, 908–09 (1993) (using interest convergence to explain Congress’s favorable response to the Japanese-American request for reparations).
123. Delgado, supra note 8, at 31–43; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 476
(1954).
124. Delgado, supra note 8, at 31–43. The Court reversed Hernandez’s conviction.
Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 480–82.
125. Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 481.
126. Delgado, supra note 8, at 43–50.
127. Id. at 45.
128. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 8, at 1764 (2003).
129. Feldman, supra note 8, at 871–72.
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Feldman, the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the Establishment Clause is
predictably determined by the dominant group’s favored religion: Christianity.130 Only when the government attacks Christianity are “outgroup religions”
able to receive concessions.131 Professor Cynthia Lee used interest convergence as the lynchpin in establishing a “cultural defense” in criminal law that
she coined “cultural convergence.”132 Cultural convergence is the idea that
minority and immigrant cultural defense claims that are successfully introduced as evidence at a criminal trial “are more likely to receive accommodation
when there is convergence between their cultural norms and American cultural
norms.”133
This Article employs interest convergence to gain a basic understanding
of the Court’s right to counsel decisions. In identifying eras of convergence
and divergence, this Article will demonstrate the way in which interest convergence may be used to explain trends in the Court’s jurisprudence on this topic.
By understanding the prominent interests of the dominant group and the subordinate group at the times of these decisions, a parallel may be drawn between
the trajectory of the Court’s interpretive approach and the larger political culture.

III. CONVERGENCE: POWELL AND GIDEON
Powell and Gideon are both celebrated and firmly entrenched precedential cases.134 The decisions are often analyzed and admired for their pronounced commitment to the principle of equality.135 While they represent social and racial progress, it is important to consider the context in which they
were decided. Application of the interest convergence paradigm reveals that
these cases were contradiction-closing cases decided in times of great friction,
both domestically and internationally.
In an era remembered for the Great Depression, the Ku Klux Klan
(“KKK”), and the rise of communism, Powell was celebrated by those in the
dominant group who found value in a national proclamation of fairness, as well
as those in policymaking positions capable of understanding the political advances at home and abroad that would follow a reaffirmation of America’s legal commitment to equality.136 With the number of Americans in poverty
growing each day and racial violence running rampart across the South, the

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 871.
Id. at 871–72.
Lee, supra note 8, at 939.
Id. at 914.
See Nannette Jolivette Brown, 75th Anniversary of Powell v. Alabama Commemorated, 56 LA. B.J. 19, 19 (2008); Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 113, 115 (2012).
135. See Brown, supra note 134, at 19; Dripps, supra note 134, at 115.
136. See Brown, supra note 134, at 19.
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country was in dire need of an official declaration reasserting America’s fidelity to equality.137 Thus, the outcome in Powell cannot be read without some
thought of the decision’s value to the dominant group.
In 1932, the Court decided Powell v. Alabama.138 A consequence of the
infamous Scottsboro Boys trials, this case was elevated to international status
by communist propaganda, exposing American racism and further exacerbating racial tensions.139 The facts of Powell are well documented.140 In that case,
nine black teenagers were charged with raping two white women in Alabama.141 They were swiftly convicted and sentenced to death.142 The convictions were appealed on the grounds that the defendants were deprived of a fair
trial, counsel, and an impartial jury.143 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and declared:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel,
and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the
court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law . . . .144

The Court concluded that the trial court erred in its failure to provide the defendants with “reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel,” as well its
failure to make an “effective appointment of counsel.”145 Because the Sixth
Amendment only applied to the federal courts at the time, the Court decided
the case on due process grounds.146 It concluded that the defendants were not
accorded the right to counsel and this, in turn, infringed upon the due process
guarantee of a fair trial articulated in the Fourteenth Amendment.147 Two of
the most conservative Justices, Justices Butler and McReynolds, dissented.148
They argued that the defendants received an adequate and fair trial, and, in the
137. See id.
138. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
139. The “Scottsboro Boys” is a famous American story. See generally JAMES

HASKINS, THE SCOTTSBORO BOYS (1994); DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY
OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1979).
140. HASKINS, supra note 139, at 13–22.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Powell, 287 U.S. at 49.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 71. Six years later in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court held that all defendants
in a federal criminal prosecution, including those unable to secure or employ an attorney, have a right to counsel, unless specifically waived. 304 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938).
However, the Court first declined to incorporate the right to appointed counsel to the
states in Betts v. Brady. 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
148. Powell, 287 U.S. at 73–77 (Butler, J., dissenting).
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event they had not, the principles of federalism dictated the Court refrain from
intervening.149
First, Powell demonstrated to the world that the United States was firm in
its commitment to equality. Communism was encroaching on the natural order
of the domestic political situation, and Joseph Stalin, with his brutal method of
leading the communist movement, reigned supreme.150 Additionally, the Great
Depression brought with it a validation of the communist belief that the certain
death of capitalism was gradually being realized through the creation of a classconscious proletariat.151 At this time, communists were extremely active on
the civil rights front, and the Scottsboro case provided the perfect platform to
expose the United States, and, therefore, capitalist societies, as offering its citizens only a shallow commitment to equality.152 In the face of intense international and domestic scrutiny, Powell stood as a pronouncement that constitutional safeguards were granted to everyone, irrespective of class and race. The
opinion was instantly hailed a landmark case in news outlets.153 In effect, the
decision gave America credibility in its demonstration that the democratic system of government promises to value the equality principle. Such a pronouncement by America’s highest court satisfied the dominant group’s interest in rehabilitating its image abroad.154
The decision also sent a message to the poor that the U.S. Constitution
will protect the rights of citizens, regardless of wealth (and race). The New
York stock market crashed in 1929, ushering in the Great Depression.155 By
1932, U.S. manufacturing output fell to 54% of its 1929 level.156 Much of the
country was unemployed, with blacks complaining that they were “the last [to
be] hired and the first [to be] fired.”157 The financial strain and intense despair
suffered by the American poor would not begin to lift until well into President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Administration. The declaration that everyone be
afforded equal treatment under the law despite socio-economic standing buttressed the position that the United States remained loyal to the principle of
equality.
Finally, Powell also offered a federal statement on the issue of race relations. During this era, racial anxieties increased with the expansion of white
supremacy and Jim Crow policies.158 Reaching its peak membership of five
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
CARTER, supra note 139, at 161–73.
Id. at 137–38.
Id. at 61–73, 133–73.
Id. at 163.
See Feldman, supra note 8, at 854.
See SHARON HALEY, THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY 246

(1992).
156. Id. at 234.
157. William A. Sundstrom, Last Hired, First Fired? Unemployment and Urban

Black Workers During the Great Depression, 52 J. ECON. HIST. 415, 420 (1992).
HALEY, supra note 155, at 246.
158. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 101–02 (1955).
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million in the mid-1920s, the newly revived KKK terrorized the South and extended its aim to include racial and religious minorities.159 Jim Crow was also
in full effect during this time. Statewide prohibitions on race mixing permeated
the South, with state and local ordinances requiring Jim Crow sports, parks,
and modes of transportation.160 For example, at the Democratic National Convention in Houston, Texas, in 1928, black attendees were restricted to the rear
of the balcony, separated by chicken wire.161 While often excluded from the
dominant group, Powell symbolically ensured that poor, black Americans were
not exempt from constitutional protection.162 This served the dominant group’s
interest by demonstrating to the world that America was a country predicated
upon the principles of equality and fairness.163 Although the Scottsboro Boys
ultimately suffered a decades-long battle for freedom, as a contradiction-closing case, Powell served to quell the sense that justice was different for the subordinate group, while simultaneously guaranteeing the right to counsel to the
poor, albeit in capital cases.164 For the dominant group, Powell stood as a symbol that America remained committed to egalitarian principles despite communist propaganda to the contrary.165 In sum, the decision sent a broader message that the Court would step in during times of unequal treatment.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court faced similar pressures. Gideon incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and further extended that
right to indigent defendants in all criminal prosecutions, federal and state.166
In overruling Betts v. Brady,167 the Court set itself on a new trajectory in constitutionally ensuring that criminal prosecutions accord with due process.168 In
reaching its conclusion, the Gideon Court quoted Powell extensively.169 The
159. Id.
160. Id. at 104.
161. Chronology of Black Republicans and Democratic Leanings, MINORITY

OPPORTUNITY NEWS 21 (May 1998), http://northdallasgazette.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Vol.-7-No.-5-May-1998.pdf.
162. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
163. See Feldman, supra note 8, at 854, 867.
164. See HASKINS, supra note 139.
165. See id.
166. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963).
167. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon, 372 U.S. 335. For
the Court, the Betts opinion’s refusal to extend the right to counsel to state court prosecutions was disingenuous at best. With plenty of prior precedent on the subject, the
Betts Court should have discovered the critical nature of the right to counsel and the
necessity of defense counsel during criminal prosecutions.
168. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
169. Id. at 344–45 (“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
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Court recognized the need to yet again promote the equality principle in the
right to counsel context.
The Court decided Douglas v. California the same day it decided Gideon.170 In Douglas, the Court held that indigent defendants are entitled to representation in criminal appeals granted as of right.171 However, the case was
decided on equal protection grounds as opposed to right to counsel. The Court
stated:
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel’s examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling
of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a
preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to
shift for himself.172

With this, the Court further entrenched the relationship between the right to
counsel and the equality principle. By explicitly acknowledging unfairness in
a process that predicates the assistance and skill of counsel on an ability to pay,
the Court insinuated that equal protection was an alternative constitutional conduit to indigent defense.173
The recognition of Gideon as a victory for the poor and minority communities is well deserved. It changed the procedural and substantive landscape of
criminal prosecutions and is legally treated as a “watershed” decision with retroactive application.174 But there is a different understanding of Gideon, which
takes into account the socio-political context of the decision. Two primary
issues confronted the United States at the time Gideon was litigated: the Civil
Rights Movement and the right of communism. Together, these issues created
the need for a pronouncement of the equality principle. Gideon served as a
contradiction-closing case that promoted that interest.

the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.” (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932))).
170. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 353 (1963).
171. Id. at 357–58.
172. Id.
173. However, this intimation was short lived, with the Court finding no right to
appointed counsel in discretionary appeals in Ross v. Moffitt in 1974. 417 U.S. 600,
610 (1974).
174. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
INVESTIGATION 26–27 (2008).
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Gideon was decided in March of 1963.175 Described as the “high point
of the Civil Rights Movement,”176 the year commenced with an inaugural address by the Governor of Alabama, George Wallace, proclaiming, “In the name
of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line in the dust
and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say segregation now,
segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.”177 Although Brown ordered the
desegregation of public schools in 1954, only seventeen schools in the South
were desegregated, demonstrating the South’s disregard for the civil rights of
blacks.178 By 1963, it was absolutely clear that the complaints and protests of
southern blacks had morphed into a mass social movement spanning across the
country.179 Martin Luther King, Jr. was touring the country promoting racial
equality, while Malcolm X was emerging as a leader in the more militant Nation of Islam.180 In 1963, the Civil Rights Movement was slowly morphing
into the War on Poverty, linking the plight of blacks with poor whites.181 In
addition, President John F. Kennedy was considering the idea of delivering a
civil rights bill to Congress.182
It was no secret that southern states used the criminal justice system as a
vehicle for controlling the activities of civil rights activists at the time of Gideon.183 While it is estimated that approximately twenty thousand people were
arrested between 1961 and 1963, fifteen thousand of those people were arrested
in 1963 alone.184 Failing to explicitly incorporate the right to counsel and extend that right to the poor would continue to result in unreasonable arrests and
kangaroo court convictions for not only the poor and black communities, but
also activists and intellectuals. Without such protections, a mishap on the part
of the South could potentially ignite the fury of the more militant and aggressive civil rights groups such as Malcolm X’s Nation of Islam, adding a further
taint to America’s international image.

175. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963).
176. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE

AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 37 (2010).
177. Wallace
Quotes, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/wallace/sfeature/quotes.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
178. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY 632 (1944).
179. ALEXANDER, supra note 176, at 37.
180. TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-1965
(1998) [hereinafter BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE]. See also TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING
THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-1963 (1988).
181. ALEXANDER, supra note 176, at 39.
182. Id. at 38–39.
183. BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE, supra note 180, at 482–85 (discussing the jailing of
Freedom Riders in Mississippi).
184. MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1990, at 69 (1991).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 9

154

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

In 1963, the United States was also intensely engaged in the Cold War.185
The early 1960s marked the era of nuclear alarms testing, bringing with it a
deep sense of fear of communism within the ranks of the American government.186 The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the United States and the Soviet
Union to the brink of nuclear war in the fall of 1962, demonstrating the strength
and proximity of communism to America. Images of white police hosing down
black citizens did not fare well for the United States.187 News reports of outrageous racial injustices in the United States called into question the government’s fidelity to espoused democratic principles. This served as communist
ammunition in the Cold War battle for Third World ideological allegiance.
With Gideon, the Court was achieving more than just answering a constitutional question by extending Sixth Amendment protections to the poor. It
was reaffirming its commitment to the equality principle, just as it had done in
Powell. Equality was now constitutionally mandated through the abstract guarantee of counsel to the poor. The Court’s opinion served the interests of the
dominant power structure similarly to the way Powell served those interests; it
provided the dominant group with legal backing for the political rhetoric it espoused of freedom and equality in Cold War battleground countries. It further
demonstrated America’s continued commitment to equal treatment across the
socio-economic spectrum. Gideon thus added support and integrity to the idea
that the country was confronting domestic social justice issues and seemingly
making progress. Furthermore, the egalitarian values espoused in the opinion
fell in line with America’s stated position on fairness and equality. In the struggle to attract Cold War allies, such a pronouncement would be hard to ignore.
While these points may seem like inadequate evidence of a self-interested
pull to produce the decisions in Powell and Gideon, they are significant to the
assessment of the Court’s statement on equality because Justices do not determine cases in a vacuum. Instead, they make decisions within the contemporary
political culture and bring with them their own values and interests. Powell
and Gideon are no doubt constitutional victories for the poor. However, they
are also a study in judicial decision-making and represent contradiction-closing
cases in that they are examples of how judicial outcomes coincided with the
socio-political climate at the time. Both of these decisions were issued when
the country was faced with domestic and international unrest threatening to
disrupt the social order. The interests of the dominant group and the subordinate group converged on the issue of the right to counsel and indigent defense
because it emphasized a value that supported both constituents’ interests: the
equality principle.
At home, Powell and Gideon demonstrated the Court’s fidelity to equal
treatment. While state legislatures and the Executive Branch were seemingly
trampling on the rights of the poor and minorities, the Court served as the

185. TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE 137 (1987).
186. Id. at 63, 91.
187. Id. at 137–43.
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keeper of civil liberties.188 In the abstract, Powell and Gideon were understood
as wins for social justice, implicitly planting a seed that meaningful gains were
on the horizon. On the ground, equality for poor and minority communities
meant that that they would be accorded the rights bestowed on all American
citizens when facing the criminal justice system. Abroad, Powell and Gideon
may have played a symbolic role in the reaffirmation of the equality principle
necessary to attract allies during the Cold War and preserve national security.
As the debate continues regarding whether the outcomes of these cases were
realized, there can be no doubt that without them, thousands of indigent criminal defendants would be without lawyers for one of the most important events
of an individual’s life: a criminal prosecution. The convergence of the interests
that led to Powell and Gideon soon faded with the arrival of the dominant
group’s backlash from the progressive policies and politics of the 1960s.

IV. RETRENCHMENT, DIVERGENCE, AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
Interest convergence understands that eras of convergence are short-lived
and followed by a retrenchment manifesting itself in restrictive interpretations
of reformist policies aimed at enforcing civil liberties.189 After the social
movements of the 1960s and early 1970s, American culture underwent a conservative revolution, which transformed the way constitutional freedoms and
rights were understood. A doctrinal reading of the decisions in Strickland and
Hill demonstrates a conservative approach to constitutional interpretation.
Alone, these cases are a sound exercise in strict construction. Together, they
represent a deviation from the Court’s earlier right to counsel jurisprudence.
Why the change? The decision to break with the Court’s earlier interpretation
of the right to counsel cannot be understood without considering the values and
interests of the dominant group. The interest in stopping the encroaching civil
rights of the poor and minority governed the ideology of the dominant group
in the 1980s, as such gains could upset the social order. With Soviet Russia no
longer an international threat, the dominant group was preoccupied with advancing the conservative agenda, which primarily consisted of promoting federalism and individual responsibility.190 In this section, I argue that the conservative agenda prompted a divergence of interests between the dominant
group and the subordinate group. While this divergence permeated American
culture, the Court’s jurisprudence adjusted its frame when analyzing right to
counsel cases and moved away from the rights-centered language in Powell
and Gideon.

188. Id. at 137.
189. Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 526.
190. Elisabeth Zoller, Citizenship After the Conservative Movement, 20 IND. J.

GLOB. STUD. 279, 298–299 (2013).
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In May of 1984, the Court handed down Strickland v. Washington.191
Strickland firmly established that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel.192 However, the two-step
test the Court crafted to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel set
an extremely high threshold for defendants to meet.
In Strickland, the respondent was indicted in Florida for kidnapping and
murder.193 Although he was appointed “an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him” and counsel advised him against confessing, the respondent confessed to the crimes, waived his right to a jury trial, pled guilty to three capital
murder charges, and waived his right to an advisory jury at his capital sentencing hearing.194 In preparation for sentencing, respondent’s counsel conducted
a minimal investigation, as he claimed to be experiencing a sense of “hopelessness” caused by respondent’s failure to heed his advice.195 The respondent was
sentenced to death and subsequently appealed claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel.196 The Court granted certiorari and held that respondent’s counsel
was not ineffective within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to
the right to effective assistance of counsel.197
Strickland provided the Court with an opportunity to craft a constitutional
test by which lower courts could evaluate Sixth Amendment claims of inadequate representation. In the opinion, the Court set forth a two-pronged test
used to evaluate ineffectiveness claims. The threshold question is “whether
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”198 The
first prong of the test requires an assessment of attorney performance, while

191. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 668 (1984).
192. Id. at 686–95. In the assessment of attorney performance, a “defendant must

show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Id. at 688. Courts are to consider the totality of the circumstances using “[p]revailing
norms of practice” to judge the performance at issue. Id. In Strickland, the Court
looked to ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, with a specific focus on “Defense Function.” Id. Present in the analysis is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell
within the range of “reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. A court reviewing
the case must adjudge counsel’s performance at the time of the conduct at issue, with
defendants pointing specifically to acts or omissions of counsel that were unreasonable.
Id. at 690. The prejudice prong of the test requires that a defendant demonstrate “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. There is also a presumption
that the judge and/or jury acted in accordance with the law, and this prong, too, requires
consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 694–95.
193. Id. at 671–72.
194. Id. at 672.
195. Id. at 672–73.
196. Id. at 678.
197. Id. at 700.
198. Id. at 687.
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the second prong considers whether counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant.199 Although Strickland was decided in 1984, the Court would not find
a valid ineffective assistance of counsel challenge until 2000, demonstrating
the difficulty in meeting the high threshold showing the Court established.200
One year after Strickland, the Court decided Hill v. Lockhart.201 In Hill,
the Court expanded the reach of Strickland, holding that the Strickland test was
appropriate to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context
of guilty plea challenges.202 In Hill, the petitioner pled guilty to first-degree
murder and theft.203 The petitioner received the State’s recommended sentence
and signed a “plea statement” that included a provision whereby the petitioner
asserted that he understood his rights and voluntarily pled guilty.204 On appeal,
the petitioner claimed that his court-appointed attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel.205 According to the petitioner, his attorney failed to inform him that as a second-time offender he would be mandated to serve half of
his sentence before becoming eligible for parole.206 Instead, petitioner claimed
that defense counsel told him that he would have to serve one-third of his sentence before being eligible.207 In assessing ineffective assistance of counsel,
the Court concluded that petitioner failed to establish the prejudice prong of
the Strickland test. First, although the advice itself was erroneous, it was not
prejudicial.208 Moreover, because petitioner did not claim that if defense counsel had accurately advised him of parole eligibility he would have insisted on
trial and not pled guilty, the Strickland Court determined that petitioner failed
on the prejudice prong.209
The decisions in Strickland and Hill offered proof that the Court was
abandoning an expansionist interpretation of constitutional liberties and effecting a regression on its earlier emphasis of the significance of fairness and equality in constitutional jurisprudence. Neither in Strickland nor Hill was there any
mention of equality, equal rights, or the principle of equality. While the 1980s
witnessed a retrenchment from gains made during the earlier social movements, the equality principle was drowned out by calls for an end to affirmative
action and tougher criminal laws.210 Conservative principles provided a platform to encourage personal responsibility and accountability, translating into a
phasing out of egalitarian policies. Conservatism manifested itself in a variety

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 55–60 (1985).
Id. at 58–59.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 54–55.
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id.
ALEXANDER, supra note 176, at 45–50.
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of contexts, including higher education, socio-economic opportunities, and penal policy.
First, subtle conservative rhetoric framed race relations as a contest between hardworking whites and worthless blacks, spurring anti-affirmative action sentiment. Regents of University of California v. Bakke211 exemplified the
uncertainty within the political American body concerning the way race was to
inform the current socio-legal order. In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected U.C.
Davis’s affirmative action program, asserting that although the school’s admissions program articulated a compelling interest in the need for diversity, it
failed to narrowly tailor the method to achieve that interest.212 Also at this
time, big business and conservative lobbying groups advocating anti-affirmative action legislation successfully gained momentum, resulting in the later repeal of a number of affirmative action policies in the 1990s.213
Second, the country was experiencing a recession that included over seventy bank failures, the savings and loan crisis, and high unemployment due to
corporate outsourcing of manufacturing jobs.214 While the poor, as a whole,
suffered devastating setbacks, urban black communities were more severely
impacted.215 Poor whites and blacks competed for manufacturing jobs, producing a further division within the subordinate group. In the 1970s, over half
of all blacks working in urban areas held blue-collar jobs.216 By 1987, the
employment rate of black men in industrial occupations was 28%.217
Third, the introduction of crack-cocaine in the illicit drug market allowed
conservatives the opportunity to gain support for the war on drugs. Crack was
presented as a “black drug” with the potential to corrupt white suburbia, resulting in a further divergence of interests between the dominant group and racial
Finally, conservative propaganda birthed the “Welfare
minorities.218
Queen.”219 Carefully framed in race-neutral terms, conservative rhetoric propagated images of poor, lazy, black women with multiple illegitimate children
living off of hard working, blue-collar, white tax dollars.220 The resulting backlash exacerbated the “us versus them” division not only between the dominant
group and the subordinate group, but also within the subordinate group, pitting
working whites against blacks.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 314–15.
ALEXANDER, supra note 176, at 45–50.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 50–51 (citing WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE
WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 30 (1997)).
217. WILSON, supra note 216, at 30.
218. Roland G. Fryer et al., Measuring Crack Cocaine and Its Impact, ECON.
INQUIRY 1, 6–7 (2006), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/fhlm_crack_cocaine_0.pdf.
219. See generally KAARYN GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011).
220. Id. at 36.
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Strickland and Hill also advanced the conservative agenda by demonstrating that the Court would no longer provide constitutional refuge to the subordinate group in the context of criminal procedure. With the “tough on crime”
strategy in full force, criminal defendants faced a conservative Court with little
regard for Warren Court policies. On October 14, 1982, President Ronald
Reagan declared a “War on Drugs” in an era where fewer than 2% of Americans believed drug use was the most important issue facing the country.221
Having a Republican majority in the Senate and a Republican President, conservatives established a number of punitive penal measures, while simultaneously defunding or repealing social programs for the poor.222 The ninety-ninth
Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.223 The legislation was the first comprehensive overhaul of the federal criminal code since
the 1930s.224 The 1984 legislation included the Sentencing Reform Act225 and
the Armed Career Criminal Act.226 Four years later, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1988227 would reinstitute the death penalty for major federal drug felonies
and murder,228 while simultaneously increasing criminal sanctions for marijuana-related offenses.229 The legislation and the accompanying practices enacted during the War on Drugs substantially contributed to the establishment
221. Julian Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime and Criminal Justice, in 16 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99, 129 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992).
222. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1762, 98
Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A.); Housing and
Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, H.R. 1, 98th Congress (repealing the authorization
of Section 8, the federal housing program subsidizing the majority of federal housing
program recipients). See also David E. Rosenbaum, Reagan Insists Budget Cuts Are
Way to Reduce Deficit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/08/us/reagan-insists-budget-cuts-are-way-to-reduce-deficit.html.
223. Comprehensive Crime Control Act, § 1762.
224. See Crime Control Acts, chs. 299–304, 48 Stat. 780, 780–83 (1934) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A.). Congress codified a number of federal crimes, including crimes related to assaulting or killing federal officers, frauds
committed against banks, interstate kidnapping, and crimes defined for the purpose of
administration in the federal prisons. Id. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 101, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.A.) did not focus on creating federal crimes. Recognizing that
crime is primarily a “state and local” problem, the legislation provided funding opportunities for states that developed comprehensive crime plans in their jurisdictions. Id.
225. The Sentencing Reform Act included mandatory federal sentencing guidelines
and severe penalties for drug-related offenses. Comprehensive Crime Control Act, §
1762.
226. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2017). If a felon has two or more prior predicate
felonies which constitute “a violent felony” or a “serious” drug crime, the minimum
sentence is fifteen years in prison with a maximum of life imprisonment. Id.
227. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 1001, 102 Stat. 4181
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.A).
228. Id.
229. Id.
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of a criminal justice system with the highest incarceration rate in the world,
with its prisons comprised of primarily poor and disproportionately minority
people. To fund this “war,” the budgets and spending of federal law enforcement skyrocketed. In the early 1980s, the Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”) antidrug spending grew from $86 million to over $1 billion.230 The
FBI budget increased eleven times the amount provided for in 1980: from $8
million to $95 million in 1984.231 Strickland and Hill helped ensure those dollars were well spent by closing doctrinal loopholes that would allow criminals
constitutional relief.
Prior to Reagan’s first presidential election, America was experiencing a
conservative backlash to the progressive gains made during the Civil Rights
Movement and the War on Poverty.232 Electing Reagan represented the dominant culture’s leaning toward more conservative values and interests. While
actively resisting policies grounded in equality, specifically racial equality such
as busing and affirmative action, conservatives reconstructed America’s understanding of civil rights and the equality principle.233 Issues regarding crime
and cases concerning criminal procedure produced fruitful opportunities to employ conservative interpretations to otherwise progressive policies. Strickland
and Hill represented retrenchment from the more liberal interpretative style of
the Court in Powell and Gideon. In employing a narrow approach to interpretation and a seemingly strong fidelity to stare decisis, the Court was implicitly
promoting conservative values and interests in personal responsibility and accountability. Equality was never mentioned in either opinion, thus removing
the concept from the analysis and the idea from the jurisprudential vernacular
in the Sixth Amendment context. Thus, equality, as a recognized constitutional
principle, was neglected.
By assessing possible external considerations that factor into judicial decision-making, the interest convergence analysis reveals that the Court’s retrenchment from emphasizing egalitarian principles paralleled the conservative
backlash in the larger political culture. When considering the socio-political
climate at the time, Strickland and Hill are to be expected. The break with the
Court’s strong fidelity to the principle of equality reflected in Powell and Gideon was noticeably absent in Strickland and Hill, with those cases focusing
more on presumptions and definitions than the equality principle. This stark
divergence of interests between the dominant group and the subordinate group
continued into the twenty-first century, until problems in plea bargaining produced an opportunity to reconsider the understanding of the right to counsel.

230. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 123 (1997).
231. Id. at 52.
232. Id.
233. Id. 50–51.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/9

AND

ORDER

IN

28

Silva: Ringing the Bell

2017]

RINGING THE BELL

161

V. CONVERGENCE AND THE PLEA BARGAINING TRILOGY
The divergence of interests in the 1980s and 1990s played a significant
role in shaping today’s justice system. Conservative criminal policies from the
divergence led to an explosion of the prison population, with the incarceration
rate quadrupling between 1980 and 2003.234 In 2008, one in one hundred adults
in America was behind bars,235 and one in thirty-one was under some form of
custodial supervision.236 While criminal courts across the nation experienced
difficulty with the volume of criminal prosecutions, prosecutors and defense
attorneys faced pressure to quickly resolve cases by plea bargain.237 The practice of plea bargaining, which the Court had never constitutionally acknowledged as an official part of the criminal process, took on a life of its own,
prompting new constitutional questions concerning the right to counsel.238 No
longer able to ignore the doctrinal questions related to the realities of plea bargaining, the Court granted certiorari in three cases: Padilla, Frye, and Lafler.
In those cases, the Court issued arguably pragmatic decisions, providing a
baseline understanding of the constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants during the plea process.239
Padilla v. Kentucky changed the landscape in that it shed light on the
shadow system of plea negotiations. In Padilla, the petitioner pled guilty to
drug charges related to the alleged transportation of a large amount of marijuana in Kentucky and was ordered to be deported.240 The petitioner was a native
of Honduras but was a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over
forty years and served in the U.S. Armed Forces during Vietnam.241 He contended that during discussions with defense counsel, he was assured that a conviction of the drug-related charges would not result in deportation.242 He further claimed that had he known that such deportation consequences existed and

234. Vincent Schiraldi et al., Poor Prescription: The Costs of Imprisoning Drug
Offenders in the United States, JUST. POL’Y INST. 1, 2 (2000), http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/PoorPrescription.pdf.
235. One in 100: Behind Bars in 2008, PEW CTR. ON STATES 1, 5 (2008),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/sentencing_and_corrections/onein100pdf.pdf [hereinafter PEW, One in 100] (explaining that at the beginning of 2008 the national adult inmate count was 2,319,258).
236. One in 31: The Long Arm of American Corrections, PEW CTR. ON STATES 1,
8 (2009), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2009/03/02/pspp_1in31_report_final_web_32609.pdf [hereinafter PEW, One in 31].
237. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What’s Discovery Got to
Do with It, 23 CRIM. JUST. 28 (2008).
238. Id.
239. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133
(2012).
240. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 357.
241. Id. at 359.
242. Id.
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were mandatory upon conviction, he would have insisted on going to trial.243
With this, Padilla alleged a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel
claim based on the erroneous advice from his attorney.244 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens agreed with the petitioner, finding deficient performance
but leaving the issue of prejudice resulting from the misinformation provided
to petitioner by defense counsel to the lower courts to decide.245
In Padilla, the Court did two important things. First, the Court declared
that “the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment,” requiring the effective assistance of counsel.246 Prior to Padilla, the Court refrained from recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to counsel during plea bargaining. The constitutional reach of the
right to counsel during the plea process was premised upon a vague statement
that there existed a general right to counsel prior to entering a formal guilty
plea.247 Problems concerning effective counsel were largely limited to issues
concerning the waiver of constitutional rights in a plea agreement as opposed
to the effective assistance of counsel during the plea negotiation process.248
Any emphasis the Court placed on the critical role counsel played in the fair
administration of justice was offered in dicta.249 It was not until Padilla that
the Court unequivocally thrust Sixth Amendment protections into the plea negotiation process.
Second, the Court’s opinion recognized criminal defendants facing possible deportation as a demographic “least able to represent themselves.”250 By
acknowledging this group as such, the Court touched on equality, implicitly
injecting the principle into the right to counsel discussion. Never before had
the Court intervened in the actual plea bargaining negotiation process. And
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id. at 364–65.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 373. The Court further determined that it is an affirmative duty of defense counsel to advise her client regarding the deportation consequences of a criminal
conviction. Id. at 381.
247. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941). See also Waley v. Johnston,
316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942).
248. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) (stating that “[p]rior to trial
an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an independent examination of
the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved and then to offer his informed
opinion as to what plea should be entered”).
249. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 118–19 (1955) (a case involving a plea of
guilty with Court discussing due process violation “where the circumstances show that
his rights could not have been fairly protected without counsel”); Moore v. Michigan,
355 U.S. 155, 159 (1957) (in a case involving a guilty plea entered without counsel, the
Court held that “petitioner’s case falls within that class in which the intervention of
counsel, unless intelligently waived by the accused, is an essential element of a fair
hearing”); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1961) (holding that when one
pleads guilty without counsel to a capital charge, prejudice results and the conviction
must be reversed).
250. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 370–71.
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when the Court did intervene, it did so on behalf of a group “least able to represent themselves.”251
Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper were decided in 2012. While Frye
set the test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims during plea negotiations,252 Lafler discussed remedies.253 The main issue in Frye was “whether
defense counsel has the duty to communicate the terms of a formal offer to
accept a plea on terms and conditions that may result in a lesser sentence, a
conviction on lesser charges, or both.”254 The Court answered in the affirmative, concluding that when defense counsel failed to communicate an offer to
his client, he failed to provide effective assistance of counsel within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.255 In doing so, the Court recognized that plea
bargains are “central” to the administration of justice.256 The Court asserted
that “defense counsel [has] responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the
Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical stages.”257 For
the Court, the failure to recognize this reality would in effect gut much of the
Sixth Amendment’s meaning because “ours ‘is for the most part a system of
pleas, not a system of trials.’”258 In order to remain loyal to the constitutional
imperative of the Sixth Amendment, the Court demonstrated an appreciation
of the role plea bargaining plays in the justice system.259
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id.
See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133 (2012).
See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012).
Frye, 566 U.S. at 145. In Missouri v. Frye, respondent Galin Frye was charged
with driving with a revoked license in August of 2007. Id. at 138. The prosecutor sent
Frye’s defense counsel a letter in which two offers were made. Id. The first offer
required Frye to plead guilty to a felony charge in exchange for the State recommending
a three-year sentence with Frye serving ten days in jail as “shock time” and no recommendation on probation. Id. at 138–39. The second offer would reduce the felony
charge to a misdemeanor with the State recommending a ninety-day jail term. Id. The
letter further stated that both offers would expire on December 28, 2007. Id. at 139.
Defense counsel failed to advise Frye that the offers were made, and they expired without any discussion between Frye and his lawyer. Id. Frye pled guilty to the Class D
felony charge with no plea agreement between himself and the State. Id. The prosecutor, however, recommended a three-year sentence with ten days served in prison and
no recommendation regarding probation. Id. The judge sentenced Frye to three years
in prison. Id. Frye filed for post-conviction relief in state court, contending that his
lawyer’s failure to inform him of the plea offers denied him effective assistance of
counsel. Id. Undergoing the Strickland analysis, the Missouri Court of Appeals agreed
and deemed Frye’s plea withdrawn and remanded to the lower court to either require a
trial or to allow Frye to plead to any offense the prosecutor charged. Id. at 139–40.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 140.
255. Id. at 143–44.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 143.
258. Id. (quoting Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170).
259. Id. at 144–45.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

31

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 9

164

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

In Lafler, the Court sought to provide a remedy to defendants prejudiced
by an attorney’s deficient performance where it results in the rejection of a plea
offer and the defendant is convicted at trial.260 In tackling the remedy, the
Court fashioned two alternatives and placed them both within the exclusive
discretion of the trial judge.261 For the Court, the proper remedy required the
prosecution to reoffer the plea.262 Once this occurs, the trial judge may decide,
in her discretion, either to vacate the conviction and accept the plea or to allow
the conviction to stand.263
Justice Scalia, author of the dissents in both Frye and Lafler, rested his
analysis primarily on the notion that the Sixth Amendment assistance of counsel guarantees fair trials only.264 There is no right to a plea bargain, and because
of this, defendants are not entitled to constitutional remedies premised upon
ineffective assistance of counsel.265 For the dissenters, the “whole new boutique of constitutional jurisprudence” is without a true remedy.266 The majority
opinion, according to the dissenters, elevated “plea bargaining from a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement.”267
The trilogy offered a re-commitment by the Court to honor established
constitutional protections recognized in the context of criminal procedure. In
these cases, the Court revisited earlier doctrinal interpretations of the right to
counsel, providing a glimpse of a resurgence of the egalitarian ideals in Powell
and Gideon. Why the shift? While the Court’s composition drastically
changed from the mid-1980s to the 2010s, the doctrinal treatment of right to
counsel challenges remained constant. I argue that two events, namely mass
incarceration and a concern with the criminal justice system, worked to produce a wave of convergence between the dominant group and the subordinate
group on the issue of criminal justice administration. While not to the same
degree as Powell and Gideon, this convergence repositioned the interest of
working poor whites in line with that of minority communities, offering a
260. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 160. In Lafler v. Cooper, the respondent was charged with
a number of felonies, including assault with intent to murder. Id. at 161. Instead of
pleading guilty pursuant to an offer made by the State where the respondent would
serve fifty-one to eighty-five months, he elected to plead not guilty upon the advice of
his attorney. Id. More specifically, respondent’s attorney allegedly stated that because
the victim was shot below the waist, the prosecutor would be unable to prove intent to
murder. Id. At trial, the respondent was convicted on all counts and was sentenced to
the mandatory minimum of 185 to 360 months in prison. Id.
261. Id. at 170–71.
262. Id. at 171.
263. Id. The Court reasoned that this permits the injury suffered by the defendant
to be reviewed by the trial court and, in turn, allows the trial court to evaluate the case
within proper constitutional guidelines. Id.
264. Frye, 566 U.S. at 155 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lafler, 566 U.S. at 175–76
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
265. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 180–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 186.
267. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/9

32

Silva: Ringing the Bell

2017]

RINGING THE BELL

165

stronger and more cohesive interest in remedying defects in the justice system.
The plea bargaining trilogy offers a series of contradiction-closing cases that
provided an official condemnation of egregious justice system practices.
First, the plea bargaining cases indicated that the Court was still willing
to address issues involving fairness and equality within the criminal justice
context when necessary. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the War on Terror, America’s struggle to maintain an international image of a free and equal society
was tarnished by mass incarceration. It is said that the United States has a “51st
state” – its jails and prisons, with a “greater combined population than Alaska,
North Dakota[,] and South Dakota.”268 The incarceration rate in American has
increased by 500% in the last forty years.269 The non-violent prison population
alone is larger than the combined populations of Alaska and Wyoming.270
Compared to other nations, the United States rate of imprisonment is 750 per
100,000, versus 628 per 100,000 in Russia and 67 per 100,000 in Denmark.271
In 2009, 1 out of every 136 U.S. residents was incarcerated, either in prison or
jail.272 At last count, the total number of imprisoned persons was 2,297,400,
with 1,617,478 in state and federal prisons and 679,992 in local jails.273 Approximately 80% of those charged with a criminal offense are poor,274 and over
two-thirds are a racial minority.275 For black defendants, the situation is bleak.
In 1960, the incarceration rate for African Americans was 660 per 100,000
people.276 In 2010, the incarceration rate for black men was 3074 per 100,000
people.277 In addition, the extra pressures from the Great Recession required
the reexamination of government spending, uncovering astronomical criminal

268. Vincent Schiraldi & Jason Ziedenberg, 2 Million Prisoners in the Land of the
Free, SFGATE (Dec. 26, 1999, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/2million-prisoners-in-the-Land-of-the-Free-3053456.php.
269. Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections, SENT’G PROJECT 2, http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf (last
updated Dec. 2015) (measuring incarceration trends from 1985 to 2013).
270. John Irwin et al., America’s One Million Nonviolent Prisoners, JUST. POL’Y
INST.
4
(Mar.
1999),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/9903_REP_OneMillionNonviolentPrisoners_AC.pdf.
271. PEW, One in 100, supra note 235, at 5, 35.
272. PEW, One in 31, supra note 236.
273. Prison Inmates at Midyear 2009 – Statistical Tables, BUREAU JUST. STAT.
(June 23, 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2200.
274. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006).
275. Irwin et al., supra note 270.
276. Bruce Drake, Incarceration Gap Widens Between Whites and Blacks, PEW
RES. CTR. (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/06/incarceration-gap-between-whites-and-blacks-widens/.
277. Paul Guerino et al., Prisoners in 2010, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 27 (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf.
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justice expenditures.278 With the justice system under scrutiny, the plea bargaining cases served as a symbolic check on problems inherent in the system.
Second, the trilogy reflected the political culture’s broader concern with
the effectiveness of criminal justice administration. In requiring effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, the Court signaled a possible return to its position as guardian of the subordinate group in the exercise of its
civil rights. While the majority opinions in Padilla, Frye, and Lafler offered a
pragmatic justification for the outcomes, the bases of the decisions were
strongly criticized by the dissents for the lack of textual backing.279 By recognizing the significance of plea bargaining, the Court opted to resolve the cases
on the basis of “the world as it is.” As the Court recognized, guilty plea dispositions comprise at least 98% of federal criminal cases280 and 94% of state
criminal cases.281 Since 1977, the ratio of federal criminal defendants who
exercise their right to a jury trial has decreased from 25% to 3%.282 Before
Padilla, scholars and advocates vociferously criticized plea bargaining, noting
a number of issues in the negotiation process.283 Understanding that the lack
of transparency in the process insulates it from judicial review, criticisms levied against the process called for regulation and constitutional protections for
defendants, many of whom are the least able to represent themselves – poor,
uneducated, and often times minority.284 Moreover, thousands of courts across
the country serve simply as plea mills, churning out a profit for the locale.285
From traffic violations, to misdemeanors, to felony charges, judges conduct
hearings and take pleas without the defendant ever consulting with or being
278. PEW, One in 100, supra note 235, at 11. Expenditures on corrections were
reported to overtake state budgets for education. Id. at 16. Total state spending on
corrections, including federal contributions, is estimated at $49 billion annually. Id. at
11. Recent figures regarding state spending on individual prisoners is estimated at an
annual average cost of $23,876 (2005 figures) and can range from $44,860 per inmate
(in Rhode Island) to $13,009 (in Louisiana). Id.
279. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 151–55 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lafler
v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 177–78, 186–87 (2012) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
280. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS:
ANNUAL
REPORT
OF
THE
DIRECTOR
242–45
(2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2010judicialbusiness_0.pdf.
281. Id.
282. Matthew Clark, Dramatic Increase in the Number of Cases Being Plea Bargained, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2013/jan/15/dramatic-increase-in-percentage-of-criminal-cases-beingplea-bargained/.
283. Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2651
(2013); Stephen J. Shulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037,
1039–45 (1984); Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL.
L. REV. 652, 658 (1981).
284. Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122
YALE. L.J. 2176, 2178 (2013).
285. Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance
After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2152 (2013).
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represented by a lawyer.286 Individuals plead guilty on the advice of a lawyer
that they just met minutes before.287 Without an official declaration regarding
constitutional protections afforded defendants during plea bargaining, governments could continue to operate in a shadow adversarial system off the record
and outside of public purview. Ignoring the realities of plea bargaining was to
silently sanction egregious mistakes and grossly negligent conduct, which no
doubt play a role in the unnecessary addition of years to prison terms, in turn,
contributing to mass incarceration in a technical sense. It is in this context that
the plea bargaining cases were decided.
Applying interest convergence to the trilogy requires a basic understanding that eras of convergence will vary in terms of the breadth and the depth to
which the interests converge. While the level of convergence may not appear
as strong as that in Powell and Gideon, a convergence existed nevertheless.
The dominant group, concerned with maintaining a reputation of a free and
equal America, was interested in proving its commitment to fair treatment, despite being the world’s leading jailer. The subordinate group, interested in the
wholesale reformation of the criminal justice system, gladly welcomed the
Court’s intervention in the shadow system of plea bargaining. For this group,
some protection was better than none. The trilogy thus offered a series of contradiction-closing cases, implicitly affirming America’s commitment to equal
justice.

VI. CONCLUSION
Interest convergence as a theoretical paradigm is rational. It not only considers process and outcome variables in its analysis, it allows for the consideration of “the world as it is.” While traditional modes of interpretation guide
the Court, the Justices lead and operate the institution; they are human beings
bringing with them their own sets of values and interests. Interest convergence
approves of using external factors in assessing judicial decision-making, thus
allowing consideration of important occurrences and events that the Justices
themselves experienced at the time of each opinion.
During each era of convergence, the contradiction-closing cases reflected
the will of the dominant group, while simultaneously conceding to the subordinate group. While Powell and Gideon theoretically placed indigent defendants on an equal playing field, the dominant group benefitted with the opinions,
adding to the rehabilitation of America’s image in both cases domestically and
internationally. Similarly, in the plea bargaining trilogy, the subordinate group
received a constitutional protection in the guarantee of counsel during plea bargaining, while the dominant group sought to buttress and rehabilitate America’s reputation as a prison state, both home and abroad. Strickland and Hill,
decided during a time of divergence, mirrored the conservative retrenchment

286. Id.
287. Id.
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of the dominant group, failing to provide any gains or concessions to the political powerless.
Many scholars perceive the Gideon decision as a victory for individual
rights in which the power of the justice system would be tempered by the constitutional guarantee of defense counsel. Frye and Lafler are also celebrated as
triumphs and natural extensions of the principles pronounced in Gideon. There
is, however, a different perception of the Gideon legacy. In the recent Yale
Law Journal Symposium, recognizing the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon, Professor Paul Butler claimed that the decision worsened the plight of poor and
minority persons generally:288
The reason that prisons are filled with poor people, and that rich people
rarely go to prison . . . is because prison is for the poor, and not the rich.
In criminal cases poor people lose most of the time, not because indigent defense is inadequately funded, although it is, and not because defense attorneys for poor people are ineffective, although some are. Poor
people lose, most of the time, because in American criminal justice,
poor people are losers. Prison is designed for them. This is the real
crisis of indigent defense. Gideon obscures this reality, and in this sense
stands in the way of the political mobilization that will be required to
transform criminal justice.289

Butler argued that Gideon makes the lawyer an end instead of a means to an
end.290 It seems the system still will over-punish and disproportionately charge
poor people and minorities, whether or not a lawyer is involved.
If we are to fix the problems, we must first see “the world as it is” and
affect our strategy accordingly. Applying theoretical frames that consider external considerations in judicial decision-making, such as interest convergence,
may allow for a more comprehensive understanding of judicial trends and outcomes. Understanding that political culture may influence judicial decisionmaking allows the justice system’s actors to adjust their strategies more completely. Neglecting to include socio-political factors is to ignore a very basic
detail: humans do not live in vacuums, including the Justices on the Court. In
the “world as it is,” the people ring the bell, the gladiators enter the arena, and
the judges decide the winner.

288. See generally Butler, supra note 284.
289. Id. at 2178.
290. Id. at 2191.
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